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141 LTD. P'SHIP V. MICROSOFT CORP.

NO. 6:07CVl13, 2009 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 70104 (E.D.
TEX. AUG. 11, 2009)

589 F.3D 1246 (FED. CIR.2009)
1. INTRODUCTION

In i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., i4i Limited
Partnership and Infrastructures for Information, Inc. (collectively,
"i4i") filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, alleging that Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft")
willfully infringed i4i's patent that claimed a "Method and System
for Manipulating the Architecture and the Content of a Document
Separately from Each Other." 1 Following a seven day jury trial,
the jury returned a verdict finding the patent valid and infringed
and awarded i4i $200,000,000 in damages. At the conclusion of
the jury trial, Microsoft and i4i filed a number of motions,
including i4i's motions for a permanent injunction and enhanced
damages.' The District Court granted these motions and awarded
an additional $40,000,000 in enhanced damages.' On appeal to the
Federal Circuit, Microsoft challenged the jury decisions on
validity, infringement, and damages as well as the District Court's

1. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CVI13, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70104, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009).
2. Id. at *7.
3. Id.at *4-5.
4. Id. at *5, *78.
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claim construction and entry of the permanent injunction.' The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit modified the effective
starting date of the injunction and affirmed in all other respects.6
Following the Federal Circuit opinion, Microsoft disputed the
court's holding that Microsoft had not challenged the jury verdict
on willful infringement and petitioned the Federal Circuit for
rehearing.7 The Federal Circuit granted the petition for rehearing
for the limited purpose of revising the original opinion's
discussion of willfulness.8
The Federal Circuit rejected
Microsoft's arguments and reaffirmed that Microsoft had not
challenged this aspect of the jury's verdict.'
II. BACKGROUND

i4i was the owner of a U.S. patent that covered a method of
processing and storing computer document content and data
structure separately and distinctly.10
Typically, a computer
document has two distinct parts: the content that is entered by the
user and various data structures that allow the computer to
efficiently recognize the meaning of the text. II Standardized
computer languages, such as Extensible Markup Language
("XML"), utilize data structures to provide the computer with
information about the significance of the user input and to tell the
computer how it should be processed." For example, markup
languages may insert "tags" around text that tell the computer that
the content is a person's name or social security number. 3 i4i's
patent referred to these tags and other similar structures as
5. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

6. Id.
7. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5036, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2010).

8. Id.
9. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. .Microsoft Corp., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010, at *66
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2010).
10. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *6. i4i's patent, U.S.

Patent No. 5,787,449, claimed a "Method and System for Manipulating the
Architecture and the Content of a Document Separately from Each Other." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. i4iLtd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1255.
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"metacodes."' 4
i4i's patented method created a reliable method of processing
and storing the content and metacodes separately and distinctly. 5
The invention utilized a "metacode map" that stored the individual
metacodes and their respective locations in the document.16 By
storing the structure separately, it is possible to manipulate the
structure of a document without reference to the actual document's
content." Thus, the patent has allowed users to work solely on a
document's content or solely on its structure."
i4i sued Microsoft in United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas alleging willful infringement by Microsoft's
word processing and editing software known as Word
("WORD"). 9 i4i alleged that Microsoft's 2003 and 2007 versions
of WORD contained a method of XML editing that infringed its
patent.2 °
A jury trial commenced and the jury returned a verdict finding
the patent valid and infringed and awarded i4i $200,000,000 in
damages. 2' Microsoft filed several motions for judgment as a
matter of law and motions for new trial regarding willful

14. Id.
15. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *6.
16. i4iLtd. P'ship,589 F.3d at 1255.
17. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *6. In a supplemental
claim construction hearing, the District Court repeated the description of the
patent as:
[M]etacodes of the document are separated from the content
and held in distinct storage in a structure called a metacode
map ....Most of the benefits flow from the fact that the
invention recognizes the separateness of content and structure
.... [C]ontent may be used for multiple purposes without
having to create multiple documents or edit multiple
documents when the content changes.
i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., NO. 6:07CV113, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39128, *7-8 (E.D. Tex. May 7, 2009). In the same hearing, the court rejected
proposed limitations by Microsoft and reiterated its position that the use of the
word "distinct" in the claim language was not a limitation that required storage
of the metacode map and the mapped content in separate files. Id. at *8.
18. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 589 F.3dat 1526.
19. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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infringement, indirect infringement, noninfringement, anticipation,
obviousness, invalidity, and damages or remittitur.22 i4i filed
motions for enhanced damages and attorney's fees, pre and postjudgment interest, post-verdict damages, and a permanent
injunction.23
Following the disposition of the lower trial, Microsoft appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal
Circuit granted Microsoft a stay on the injunction pending
appeal.24 On appeal, Microsoft renewed challenges to aspects of
the District Court's claim construction and the findings on validity
in addition to challenging the holdings on infringement and
damages.2 5 The Federal Circuit also reviewed the district court's
issuance of a permanent injunction against the sale of WORD. 6
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Microsoft's Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and New
Trial
The court began by individually reviewing the motions filed by
Microsoft at the conclusion of the jury trial, starting with
Microsoft's argument for no direct infringement. 7 Next, the court
considered Microsoft's argument for no indirect infringement.28
The court then evaluated Microsoft's challenge to the jury finding
of willful infringement.29 Next, the court evaluated Microsoft's
claim that i4i's patent was obvious and anticipated.3" Finally, the
court assessed Microsoft's challenges to the awarded damages.3 '

22. Id. at *4-5.
23. Id.
24. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19950 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 3, 2009).
25. i4iLtd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1257.
26. Id.
27. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *9.
28. Id. at*17.
29. Id. at *29.
30. Id. at *37.
31. Id. at *54.
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1. No DirectInfringement
Microsoft asserted that no reasonable jury could find that
WORD infringed i4i's patent literally or by the doctrine of
equivalents. 2
The court considered Microsoft's principal
argument to be that the definition given to "data structure" by one
of i4i's technical experts allowed for larger data structures to "be
broken down into smaller logical 'data structures."' 33 According
to the court, Microsoft argued that because there could be smaller
data structures within WORD's source code, no reasonable jury
could find that a single data structure contained a plurality of
metacodes as required by the court's claim construction."
The
court rejected this argument as a "mere disagreement with the jury
verdict."35
The court further found that Microsoft did not assert at trial that
i4i exceeded the scope of the court's claim construction or that the
construction was otherwise erroneous.3 6 According to the court,
Microsoft was proffering a new argument for an additional logical
limit on the definition of "metacode map."37 Thus, the court held
that Microsoft's claim had been waived and that there was legally
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that WORD contained
the requisite "data structure."38 For similar reasons, the court also
32. Id. at *9. See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)("[A] product or process that does not literally
infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to
infringe if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or
process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.").
33. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *10.
34. Id. The court had previously construed "metacode map" to be "a data
structure containing a plurality of metacodes." Id. at *9.
35. Id. at * 11.
The court cited Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int'l,
L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006) for the proposition that "litigants
waive their right to present new claim construction disputes if they are raised for
the first time after trial." Id. at * 12.
36. Id.
37. Id.at*1l-12.
38. Id. at *12. The court also assessed Microsoft's infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents and found that WORD contained a "metacode map"
equivalent to that described by i4i's patent. Id. at * 12-13. However, the jury
need not base its decision on this argument since the court found that WORD
literally infringed the patent. Id.
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rejected Microsoft's argument that WORD did not contain
"metacodes" as defined by the court's claim construction.39
Accordingly, the court denied Microsoft's motions for judgment as
a matter of law and new trial regarding direct infringement."
2. No Indirect Infringement
The court next addressed Microsoft's motions regarding the jury
finding of contributory41 and induced infringement.42
For
contributory infringement, Microsoft first argued that i4i produced
insufficient evidence to prove that Microsoft knew that WORD
was infringing or that WORD's XML feature did not have a
substantial non-infringing use.43
With respect to the "knowing" requirement, the court cited DSU
Med Corp. v. JMS Co. for the proposition that the required
showing of mental state for indirect infringement is "minimal" and
may be proved by circumstantial evidence.'
To satisfy this
requirement, the court pointed to i4i's evidence that Microsoft was
previously supplied with the patent number and an explanation of

39. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *14-16.
40. Id. at* 17.
41. A cause of action based on contributory infringement flows from 37
U.S.C. § 271. That section provides:
[w]hoever offers to sell or sells within the United States... a
component of a patented machine, . . . constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantialnoninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.
37 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
42. Induced infringement is a separate cause of action from contributory
infringement. "In order to prevail on an inducement claim, the patentee must
establish first that there has been direct infringement, and second that the
alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent
to encourage another's infringement." ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr.
Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
43. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *19-21.
44. Id. at 20 (citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
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the patented technology.45 The court held that this evidence and an
internal email from a Microsoft employee stating that WORD's
XML capabilities would make i4i's technology "obsolete" were
legally sufficient to support the jury conclusion that Microsoft
knew WORD's XML capabilities would infringe i4i's patent.46
On the issue of substantial non-infringing use, Microsoft argued
that any non-infringing use should focus on the use of WORD as
whole as opposed to the individual XML feature.47 The court
noted that in Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., the Federal
Circuit concluded that any analysis of whether a non-infringing
use was substantial should focus on the product as a whole because
an accused infringer "should not be permitted to escape liability as
a contributory infringer merely by embedding [the infringing
product] in a larger product with some additional, separable
feature . . . .""4 Microsoft attempted to distinguish Ricoh on the
grounds that the products had to be physically separable. 9
However, the court rejected Microsoft's argument and found that
Ricoh was directly applicable because WORD contained
"hundreds of separate features" and i4i had previously shown the
availability of standalone XML editors in the marketplace."
Applying this standard, the court rejected all of the non-infringing
uses put forth by Microsoft as insubstantial because they were
either too restrictive or impracticable given the purpose of XML 1
Microsoft further argued that it did not "sell" or "offer to sell"
any product within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 2 However,
45. Id.at *20.
46. Id.
47. Id.at *21-23. As noted above, contributory infringement requires that
the patented component of the invention not be "a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use." See 37 U.S.C. § 271 (c).
48. Id.at *22 n.5 (quoting Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550
F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
49. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *22-23 n.5

50. Id.
51. Id.at *24-25. According to the court, Microsoft asserted three noninfringing uses: (1) opening a file with XML as a WORD document; (2)
opening a document that had XML elements but no user content; and (3)
creating and saving a document with XML elements and user content, but
without reopening the document. Id.at *21.
52. Id. at *25. Section 271(c) provides that whoever "offers to sell or sells" a
component constituting a material part of an invention shall be liable as a
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the court found that Microsoft failed to raise any objections on this
ground before the jury trial and, therefore, the argument was
waived. 3
In assessing Microsoft's motion for new trial on the jury's
finding of induced infringement, the court relied on the same
evidence of "knowledge" to reject Microsoft's argument that there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of specific intent. 4
Additionally, the court rejected Microsoft's argument that the
court improperly used the words "material component" in place of
"material or apparatus" in the jury instructions on indirect
infringement.5
Accordingly, the court denied Microsoft's
56
motions.
3. No Willfulness
The court began its analysis of Microsoft's challenge to the jury
finding that Microsoft willfully infringed i4i's patent by laying out
the "objective recklessness" standard set forth by In re Seagate
Tech.57 Under the Seagate standard, in order to establish objective
recklessness "a patentee must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent" without regard to the accused infringer's state of mind. 8
Additionally, the patentee must show that the "objectively-defined
risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been
known to the accused infringer.""
According to the court, Microsoft argued that its successful
assertion of various defenses to infringement and the pre-trial
contributory infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
53. Id.at *25-26.
54. Id.at *26-27.
55. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *28.

56. Id.
57. Id. at *29 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)). In Seagate, the Federal Circuit overruled the willfulness standard
set out in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1830
(Fed. Cir. 1983), and held that a finding of willfulness required a showing of
objective recklessness. 497 F.3d at 1368-7 1.
58. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.

59. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/12
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determination that some of i4i's patented claims were invalid
barred a finding of willful infringement.6" This argument was
rejected as inconsistent with the standard set forth in Seagate.6
Specifically, the court noted that Microsoft's position "would
allow an accused infringer to stay willfully ignorant despite a high
likelihood that its actions infringe a valid patent."62 The court held
that because Microsoft did not assert that its defenses would have
been apparent to a reasonable person prior to Microsoft's
infringing activity, the assertions were irrelevant to the assessment
of the objective recklessness standard.63
Microsoft further argued that it did not pass the subjective prong
of the Seagate analysis because i4i had not presented Microsoft
with a cease-and-desist letter. 6' The court rejected this argument
and held that direct and circumstantial evidence showed that
Microsoft was aware of the high likelihood that its activities were
infringing.65
Finally, the court rejected arguments by Microsoft that improper
exclusion of evidence and improper jury instructions warranted a
new trial.66 Accordingly, the court denied Microsoft's motions for
judgment as a matter of law and new trial regarding the jury
finding of willful infringement.67
4. Obviousness andAnticipation
Microsoft's next set of challenges regarded six instances of
alleged prior art, in which Microsoft asserted that the references,
either individually or in combination, anticipated or rendered i4i's
patent obvious.68 Additionally, Microsoft asserted that a new trial
was warranted based on improper court instructions regarding
60. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *30.
61. Id. at*31.
62. Id.at *31.
63. Id. at *34.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *35-37.
67. Id. at *37.
68. Id. at *37. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)
(explaining that, in addition to novelty and utility, a patent must be "nonobvious" to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art).
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burden of proof in its defenses and the exclusion of evidence that
i4i's patent was under reexamination.69
The court first noted that at trial Microsoft only moved for
judgment as a matter of law regarding anticipation of a single prior
art reference, the S4 reference.7" Thus, Microsoft's motions for
judgment as a matter of law with respect to the four other prior art
references,
and
combinations thereof, were waived.71
Nevertheless, the court continued to evaluate the remaining claims
for anticipation by the on-sale bar in light of the S4 reference.7
S4 was a software program developed in part by i4i's founder
for a third-party that allowed users to add SGML tags to
documents.73 S4 divided documents up into "entities" that
contained both the structure and content of the documents
intermixed, as opposed to being stored separately.7 4 The dispute
centered on whether S4's patent embodied i4i's patent because the
S4 technology did not store the SGML tags and document content
separately.75
While it was undisputed that the S4 reference was sold prior to
the critical date, the court found that there was sufficient evidence
contesting whether the S4 system implemented the required
features embodying the i4i patent at the time of sale.76 Ultimately,
i4i's expert testimony and the testimony of one of the S4 inventors
that the S4 system did not contain a "metacode map" at the time it
was sold, combined with the unavailability of the original S4
source code to prove otherwise, was legally sufficient to rebut
Microsoft's claim of anticipation.77
For the remaining motion for new trials based on obviousness,
69. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *38.
70. Id. at *38-39.
71. Id. at*39.
72. Id. See also Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (explaining
that to prove anticipation by on-sale bar, defendants must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that, before the critical date, (1) the invention was the
subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale and (2) the invention was "ready
for patenting" at the time of the offer or sale).
73. i4i Ltd. P'Ship, 589 F.3d at 1262.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *41-42.
77. Id. at *42-43.
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the court reviewed the testimony regarding the prior art and held
that there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that
no single prior art reference contained each and every claim
limitation." However, Microsoft also argued that the Kugimiya
reference, one of the prior art references, provided the claim
limitations that were missing from the other references and that
together these references rendered the i4i patent obvious.7 9 The
court held that evidence that the Kugimiya invention was directed
at an unrelated field and i4i's "abundant evidence of secondary
considerations of non-obviousness" were sufficient to rebut
"Microsoft's modest showing" and did not render the jury verdict
against the weight of evidence."0
Finally, the court rejected Microsoft's arguments regarding
improper jury instructions and exclusion of evidence of
reexamination as unsupported by caselaw and not probative of any
claim regarding invalidity, respectively."'
5. Microsoft's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur Damages
The final arguments proffered by Microsoft related to the jury
award of $200,000,000 in damages.8 2 Specifically, Microsoft
argued that the court erred in admitting a telephone survey
supporting the damage award because it was hearsay and the
testimony regarding the amount of a reasonable royalty rate was
unreliable. 3
With respect to the survey, the court found that the true evidence
78. Id. at *48-49. Here, the court discussed two prior art references, the
"Rita" and "DeRose" patents. Id. at *47. There was evidence that both patents
failed to teach the "mapped content," "metacode map," or "address of use"
limitations of the i4i patent. Id. at *48.
79. Id. at *49.
80. Id. at *51-52.
81. Id. at *53. Microsoft asserted that the jury instruction stating that it was
required to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence was not warranted
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), since the PTO had not considered some of the
asserted prior art. Id. The court rejected this reading of KSR as mere dicta and
contradicted by overwhelming caselaw. Id.
82. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *54.
83. Id. at *55, *63.
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was the expert testimony and that the survey was merely used as
support.84 Therefore, the court held that the appropriate analysis
was the "reasonably relied upon by experts" analysis under Federal
Rules of Evidence 703.85 Applying this standard, the court found
that there was extensive testimony regarding the reliability of the
survey and that acceptance of Microsoft's arguments would in fact
"defeat the very purpose of a 'statistical sample' survey."86
Additionally, Microsoft challenged i4i's expert testimony that
estimated the cost of reasonable royalties based on a third-party
product at the time of infringement. 7 i4i's experts testified that
the estimation was reasonable because several other options were
considered and rejected as either too high of a price or as lacking
similar capabilities.88 Furthermore, the product itself was being
used by Microsoft during the relevant time period.89 Ultimately,
the court found that the testimony was reasonable and that
Microsoft failed to show that damages were clearly excessive.9"
B. i4i's Motions

1. i4i's Motion for Judgment on the Jury Verdict and Enhanced
Damages
Next, the court began to evaluate i4i's motions, starting with its
motion for enhanced damages.9 In reviewing the evidence in light
of the "bad faith" standard, the court reviewed internal emails from
Microsoft's XML development team that discussed i4i's patented

84. Id. at *55-56.
85. Id.
86. Id.at *58-60.
87. Id. at *63.
88. i4iLtd.P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *63-64.
89. Id.at *64.
90. Id.at *67.
91. Id.at *68. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a court may in its discretion enhance
damages up to three times when there is a finding of willful infringement or
bad-faith on the part of an infringing party. The court noted that "bad faith" in
this context "refers to an infringer's lack of due care." i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *68.
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technology. 2 The court found that the emails directly confirmed
Microsoft's awareness of i4i's patent as well as its intention to
implement similar capabilities on WORD that would make i4i's
patented invention "obsolete."93 Furthermore, Microsoft did not
present any evidence that it conducted any investigation of i4i's
patented material.94 The court noted that i4i did not assert that
Microsoft deliberately copied the patented invention; nevertheless,
the court held that the evidence indicated that Microsoft never
formed a good-faith belief of non-infringement.9 5
Additionally, the court noted that the case for enhanced damages
was furthered by Microsoft's counsel's conduct throughout the
course of litigation. 6 The court noted that during voir dire,
opening statements, and closing arguments Microsoft's counsel
made multiple statements to the jury suggesting that it was
improper for a non-practicing patent owner to sue for damages.97
The court found that Microsoft's counsel's actions were
"persistent, legally improper, and in direct violation of the court's
instructions," and such actions supported enhanced damages to
i4i.98
As result of these findings, the court awarded an additional
$40,000,000 in enhanced damages to i4i. 9 The court declined to
further award attorney fees and litigation costs, noting that i4i
delayed filing suit and that Microsoft's misconduct was not
"exceptional."' 0 0

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at *71.
Id.
Id.
Id. at*71-73.
Id. at *74.

97. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *75-77. At trial the

court issued ex parte warnings to Microsoft's counsel and gave the jury specific
instructions in attempt to "temper" the prejudice of Microsoft's counsel's
statements. Id.
98. Id. at *77.
99. Id. at *78.
100. Id.
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2. i4i 's Motion for Post-VerdictDamages to Judgment,
Prejudgment Interest, and Post-JudgmentInterest
In addition to enhanced damages, i4i also moved for post and
prejudgment interest as well as post-verdict damages based on
extrapolation of the jury verdict."' The court granted i4i postjudgment interest as uncontested and briefly rejected Microsoft's
arguments against post-verdict damages as overruled by the
court's holdings in prior motions. 02 Thus, the court awarded an
additional $144,060 per day in post-verdict damages for the
approximately three months since the jury verdict.0 3
With regard to prejudgment interest, the court found that i4i's
delay in filing suit did not prejudice Microsoft and was merely for
the purposes of prosecuting its patent. 01 4 Accordingly, the court
awarded $37,097,032 in prejudgment interest to i4i and an
additional $21,102 per day since the date of the verdict.0 5
3. i4i 's Motionfor a PermanentInjunction
In its final motion, i4i requested a permanent injunction
enjoining Microsoft from infringing the patent, including the sale
of WORD 2003 and 2007 products.0 6 The court began its analysis
of the permanent injunction factors set forth in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange with discussion of the irreparable injury sustained
by i4i.1°7
101. Id. at *79.
102. Id. at *79-81.
103. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *81.
104. Id. at *82.
105. Id. at *83.
106. Id. at *83-84. The court found that i4i's request did. not require
Microsoft to disable the infringing XML functionality in currently distributed
product. Id. at *84. However, use of the feature would nevertheless be
prohibited.
107. Id. at *84-85 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388,
394 (2006)). Under MercExchange, a plaintiff seeking permanent injunction
must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 547 U.S. at 391.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/12

14

Restauri: i4i Ltd. P'Ship v. Microsoft Corp. - No. 6:07CV113, 2009 U.S. Dis

2010]

141 LTD. V. MICROSOFT CORP.

577

The court found that Microsoft's entry into the XML
marketplace was in direct competition with i4i, regardless of i4i's
designed compatibility with WORD." 8
The court rejected
Microsoft's argument that the compatibility of the products created
growth opportunities for i4i because the fact that i4i had to adapt
to Microsoft's entry into the market place did not negate the injury
incurred by Microsoft's entry."°9 Furthermore, Microsoft's entry
into the XML marketplace rendered i4i's products obsolete in 80%
of the market and significantly damaged its brand recognition.10
Thus, the court held that i4i had shown overwhelming irreparable
injury that could not be compensated by monetary damages.''
Microsoft also contended that an injunction was improper based
on MercExchange because XML was simply a small part of the
infringing WORD products.'12 The court rejected this argument
and held that MercExchange did not apply because the XML
capabilities were not a "smaller component of a larger product"
but rather a stand-alone product with an independent market." 3
With respect to the balance of hardships analysis, the court
found that the impact of infringement on i4i was significantly
greater than on Microsoft since the technology comprised almost
all of i4i's business. "' Furthermore, the court rejected Microsoft's
argument that redesigning its software would be an "enormous
task" because it was unclear whether Microsoft could comply with
the injunction through the use of a software patch." 5
. For the final MercExchange factor of public interest, the
court
found that the injunction would have little effect on current users
of WORD because i4i did not request the functionality to be
disabled on products already in use." 6 Furthermore, the court
noted that the technology did not involve any key social issues,
108. i4i Ltd. P'ship,2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *86.
109. Id. at *88.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *89-90. (citing eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that monetary damages may be sufficient when the
patented technology is small component of a larger product)).
113. Id. at *90.
114. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *90-91.
115. Id. at*92.
116. Id. at *93-94.
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and thus according to the court, this factor also weighed in favor of
i4i.

117

Finally, the court accepted Microsoft's argument that the scope
of some of the language in i4i's proposed injunction was outside
the realm of what constituted infringing activities." 8 The language
at issue involved i4i's proposed prohibition on "making" the
infringing product, which was found not to be infringing activity
since the asserted claims were methods." 9 Accordingly, the court
adopted the remainder of i4i's proposed language and granted its
2
motion for a permanent injunction.1 1
C. Microsoft's Motion to Stay Injunction
Microsoft also moved to stay the injunction on the grounds that
(i) it was likely to succeed on appeal; (ii) the public would be
irreparably harmed absent a stay; and (iii) the pending reexamination of i4i's patent required a stay.' 2 '
The court rejected Microsoft's argument regarding likelihood of
success on appeal on the grounds that its analysis under other
motions showed that Microsoft did not present a "compelling case,
either legally or factually, that would override the irreparable
harm" faced by i4i. 122 Furthermore, the court found that the fact
that i4i's patent was pending re-examination was inconsequential
to the case at hand.

23

Microsoft further argued for an exception in its upcoming
WORD 2010 product whereby Microsoft could activate and track
the XML features on demand and pay a royalty to i4i when they
were used.' 24 The court accepted i4i's argument that this would
25
amount to a compulsory license and denied Microsoft's request.
Finally, the court found it necessary to note an inconsistency in
Microsoft's position regarding whether or not a software patch
117. Id. at *94.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *95.
Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at *96.
Id. at*98.
Id. at *98.
Id. at *99.
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could be used to remove the XML capabilities from versions
currently in use. 126 The court recalled that when initially opposing
the injunction, Microsoft had stated that it would take five months
127
to implement the injunction in versions currently in use.
However, the court noted that the evidence suggested that the
injunction could be complied with by a software patch and stated
that "[o]ddly, Microsoft's proposal regarding [on demand
activation for] WORD 2010 seem[ed] to imply an ability
manipulate its software beyond what has been previously
indicated.' ' 28 Consequently, the court denied Microsoft's motion
and ordered it to comply with the injunction within sixty days.'29
D. Microsoft's EquitableDefenses
Finally, the court addressed Microsoft's assertion of the
equitable defenses of laches and inequitable conduct.130
Microsoft's laches defense involved an assertion that i4i
intentionally delayed filing suit that resulted in prejudice to
Microsoft.'31 The court found that i4i should have reasonably
known of infringement by 2005 when its outside counsel
confirmed probable infringement and that this timeframe was not
"equitably unreasonable.' 3 2 Furthermore, the court rejected the
contention that the delay prejudiced Microsoft, because there was
evidence that Microsoft knew of the i4i patent and that it would
have been unlikely to stop selling the infringing products
33
anyways
Microsoft also argued that i4i's failure to disclose a prior art
126. i4iLtd.P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *99.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The injunction was ordered on August 11, 2009. However, as
noted, the order was stayed pending review. See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19950.
130. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *99-113. "Laches
focuses on the dilatory conduct of the patentee and the prejudice which the
patentee's delay has caused." A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const.
Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031-32 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
131. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *100.
132. Id. at*103.
133. Id. at *104.
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reference to the PTO amounted to inequitable conduct. 3 4 The
parties disputed whether the prior art was material to i4i's patent
and whether the inventors had the requisite deceptive intent in
failing to disclose it.'35 The court held that the evidence was
conflicting and that Microsoft had failed to carry its burden of
proof on the issue of materiality.'36 Similarly, the court found that
the evidence regarding intent tended to support "candid" behavior,
and when combined with the failure to prove materiality, it also
showed Microsoft's failure to meet its high burden of proof.'37
IV. THE DECISION ON APPEAL

A. Claim Construction
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Microsoft challenged the jury
findings on damages and validity and aspects of the district court's
claim construction.'38 As to the district court's claim construction,
Microsoft renewed its arguments that the use of "distinct" in the
claim language added two requirements: (1) storing the "metacode
map" and "mapped content" in separate files, and (2) the ability to
edit the document's content and its metacode map "independently
and without access" to each other.'39 The Federal Circuit took a
similar view to that of the district court and held that the claim's
plain language, specification, and prosecution history did not show
that the claim scope was limited to storage of the "metacode map"
40
and "mapped content" in separate files. 1
The Federal Circuit noted that the "closer question" was whether
the language required independent manipulation of "metacode
134. Id.at *106. "Inequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose
material information, or submission of false material information, with an intent
to deceive, and those two elements, materiality and intent, must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence." Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister
Inc.,863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
135. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at * 108.

136. Id. at *110.
137. Id.at *113.
138. i4i Ltd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1256.

139. Id.at 1257.
140. Id.at 1258-59.
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map" and "mapped content."''
The Federal Circuit noted that
none of the claims mentioned independent manipulation and that
the terms "separate" and "distinct" have a different meaning from
the term "independent."' 4 2 In the end, the Federal Circuit held that
the use of these terms and the specification's permissive language
showed that separate manipulation was not a limitation but rather
referred to the ability to work separately on either the structure or
the content while the invention keeps the two synchronized.'43
B. Validity
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the District Court's
determinations on obviousness and anticipation.'
The Federal
Circuit found that Microsoft had preserved only its right to
challenge the jury findings with respect to the S4 reference
because it did not move for pre-verdict judgment as a matter of
law on the other instances of prior art.'45 Thus, the Federal Circuit
held that Microsoft had waived its right to challenge the jury
findings underlying the nonobviousness verdict.'46 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit reviewed the record under the implicit
assumption that the jury had found the Deere factors to weigh in
favor of i4i and ultimately upheld the nonobviousness finding.'47
Next, the Federal Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling with
respect to the anticipation by the "on-sale" bar. 48 It was
uncontested that the S4 reference was sold prior to the critical date,
but the Federal Circuit reviewed the conflicting expert testimony at
trial regarding whether the S4 reference embodied i4i's patent at
the time of sale. 49 Noting that anticipation was an affirmative
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1259.
143. Id.at 1259-60.
144. i4i Ltd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1261, 1263.
145. Id.at 1261.
146. Id. at 1260-61.
147. Id.at 1261. See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (holding that the
nonobvious requirement was to be determined based on three factual inquiries:
the scope and content of the prior, differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art).
148. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1262.
149. Id. at 1262-63.
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defense, the Federal Circuit rejected Microsoft's argument that i4i
was required to corroborate its expert testimony and upheld lower
rulings because Microsoft was unable to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the patent was anticipated.15°
C. Infringement
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the jury findings of
infringement and held that there was sufficient evidence to support
a finding that at least one user of WORD practiced the claimed
methods in i4i's patent, directly infringing the patent."'
Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding of contributory infringement because
the jury could have reasonable concluded that Microsoft knew that
the XML editor was infringing and that it had no substantial
noninfringing use. 52 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that it
was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury to focus
on the custom XML editor instead of WORD as a whole when
'
addressing whether a noninfringing use was "substantial."153
In
doing so, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that "a particular tool
within a larger software package may be the relevant 'material or
apparatus' when that tool is a separate and distinct feature. 154
Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that a reasonable jury could have
concluded thatMicrosoft had induced infringement as well by
providing online training and user support for the XML
functions.155
D. Damages
The Federal Circuit next reviewed the jury's damage award and
150. Id.
151. Id.at 1266.
152. Id.at 1266-67.
153. Id.at 1264-65.
154. i4i Ltd .P'ship,589 F.3d at 1264 (quoting
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir.
F.3d at 1337 (holding that an infringer "should
liability as a contributory infringer merely by
product] in a larger product.
").
155. i4iLtd.P'ship,589 F.3d at 1266.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/12

Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.
2009)). See also Ricoh, 550
not be permitted to escape
embedding [the infringing

20

Restauri: i4i Ltd. P'Ship v. Microsoft Corp. - No. 6:07CV113, 2009 U.S. Dis

2010]

141 LTD. V. MICROSOFT CORP.

held that it was unable to decide whether the calculated royalty
was reasonable because Microsoft did not file a pre-verdict
judgment as a matter of law on damages.156 The Federal Circuit
alluded to the fact that the outcome might have been different had
it been able to review the award to determine whether it was
grossly "excessive or monstrous" under the Georgia-Pacific
factors. 7 The Federal Circuit also upheld the district court's
discretionary award of $40,000,000 in enhanced damages, noting
that the district court had statutory authority to award up to
$600,000,000.158
E. PermanentInjunction
Finally, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's ruling
on the permanent injunction considering the eBay factors. 59 The
Federal Circuit held the district court's findings for each factor
were not an abuse of discretion and that the injunction had been
properly narrowed to minimize harm to the public. 6° However,
the Federal Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
there was evidence indicating that a software patch could be
designed to implement the changes to WORD required to comply
with the injunction. 61 The Federal Circuit held that the only
evidence in the record indicated that it would take at least five
months for Microsoft to comply with the permanent injunction. 6
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit modified the effective date of the

156. Id.at 1272.
157. Id. at 1272-73. See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (laying out a list of fifteen evidentiary
facts relevant to the determination of the amount of a reasonable royalty for a
patent license).
158. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1274.
159. Id. at 1272-73.
Under the standard set forth in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that (1) it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 547 U.S. at 391.
160. i4iLtd. P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1277.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1278.
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injunction to begin five months from the August 11, 2009 order.163
V. CONCLUSION

The district court denied all of Microsoft's motions for judgment
as a matter of law and new trial on the issues of infringement,
willfulness, anticipation, obviousness, and damages. 16 4 The court
granted i4i's motion for enhanced damages and awarded an
additional $40,000,000.165 The court declined to award attorney's
fees and litigation costs.'66 The court also granted i4i's motion for
post and prejudgment interest and post-verdict damages and
awarded $37,097,032 in prejudgment interest (plus an additional
$21,102 per day since the verdict) and $144,060 per day in postverdict damages.167 The court granted i4i's motion for a permanent
injunction on the sale of WORD with the infringing XML
feature. 68
Finally, the court rejected Microsoft's equitable
defenses of laches and inequitable conduct. 169
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed district court's claim
construction and upheld the rulings and jury findings on validity
and infringement. 71 On the issue of damages, the Federal Circuit
held that it was unable to decide whether the size of the royalty
was reasonable, but it upheld the district court's discretionary
award of $40,000,000 in enhanced damages. 17 ' Finally, the
Federal Circuit upheld the entry of the permanent injunction but
modified the effective date of the injunction to begin five months
from the August 11, 2009 order on January 11, 20 10.172

163. Id.
164. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *17, *28, *37, *44,
*46, *49, *67.
165. Id. at *78.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *81-83.
168. Id. at *95.
169. Id.at *106, *113.
170. i4iLtd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1278.
171. Id. at 1272-74.
172. Id. at 1278.
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VI. ADDENDUM
The Federal Circuit's original opinion held that Microsoft did
not challenge the jury instructions or sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury's finding on the issue of Microsoft's willful
infringement.'
Following the publication of the opinion,
Microsoft challenged this holding and petitioned the Federal
Circuit for rehearing.'74 The Federal Circuit granted the petition
for rehearing for the limited purpose of revising the original
opinion's discussion of willfulness.'75
In the new opinion the Federal Circuit noted that it still viewed
Microsoft's opening brief as challenging only the District Court's
rational on enhanced damages and not the jury's willfulness
verdict.'76 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit went on to review the
jury's finding of willfulness, but noted that "the result [did] not
change."' The Federal Circuit held that the jury could have
reasonably inferred that Microsoft knew about the patent from
evidence that Microsoft employees attended demonstrations of the
patented technology, received sales kits identifying the technology
as patented, and had discussed the technology in internal emails"'
The Federal Circuit also noted that evidence supported the
conclusion that Microsoft knew that their XML technology had
highly similar functionality to i4i's patented technology, but still
did not attempt to design around the patented technology.'79
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that there was no evidence
showing that Microsoft made a good faith effort to avoid
infringement; rather, internal emails suggested that Microsoft
173. i4i Ltd. P'Ship, 589 F.3d at 1273.
174. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5036, at *1.
175. Id.
176. i4iLtd.P'ship, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010, at *63.
177. Id. As noted above, the Federal Circuit set out a new willfulness
standard in 2007 and held that a finding of willful infringement required a
showing that the infringer was aware of the asserted patent, but acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent. Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371. After satisfying this objective prong,
the patentee must also show that the infringer knew or should have known of
this objectively high risk. Id.
178. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5010, at *64-65.
179. Id.at *65.
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intended their technology to make i4i's patent "obsolete. 180
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected Microsoft's arguments to
the jury verdict and held that even had their challenge been proper,
there was still sufficient evidence to support the verdict.' 8 '
VII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The i4i suit involving their patented method presented a unique
and interesting technological challenge to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. While the court
ultimately took a correct view of the patented technology, many
readers may find it difficult to follow some of the parties'
arguments that centered on the court's claim construction. One
point of confusion may be the court's use of the term XML. To be
clear, i4i's patent did not cover any XML or SGML technologies
themselves. 82 Traditionally, documents utilizing XML would
store the metacode data intermixed with the document's content
entered by the user. 83 On the other hand, i4i's patented
technology utilized the often referred to "metacode map" to allow
storage of the metacode separately, but still keep a reference to
where it belonged in the document."' Itwas this capability that
the district court found to be utilized in the infringing WORD
products. 85
'
The i4i case also illustrates many of the evidentiary issues and
problems that are routinely faced in the calculation of damages for
180. Id.at *65-66.
181. Id.at*66.
182. For a discussion of the XML technologies at issue, see Milan Kupcevic,
XML v. i4i'sPatent v. Mcrosoft's "Custom XML, " http://milan.kupcevic.net/
(last
custom-xml-microsoft-office-word-data-store-i4i-patent-5787449-msdn/
visited Mar. 6, 2010).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. In a 2005 article, a Microsoft program manager, Brian Jones, wrote an
article explaining the addition of the ability to create a "separate data store" for
XML data that is then linked to the document through a user created
"relationship." The article boasts near identical capabilities as the i4i patent.
See Brian Jones, Integrating with business data: Store custom XML in the Office
XMLformats (Nov. 11, 2005), http://blogs.msdn.com/brianjones/archive/
2005/11/04/integrating-with-business-data-store-custom-xml-in-the-office-xmlformats.aspx.
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patent infringement. The fact that the patented technology is a
component of a larger product only serves to amplify these issues.
Notably, both opinions expose some of the complications raised by
applying the Daubert standard to expert testimony in this context,86
especially when searching for a reasonable "benchmark" royalty.1
In a recent article, two commentators criticized the expert's use of
the "25% rule of thumb" and called it "economically irrational.' 87
Furthermore, the opinions show that quotations by Microsoft
employees "touting" that they had embraced the XML market as
part of their future strategy were used as a part of the royalty
calculation and relevant to Georgia-Pacificfactors. 188 Use of these
quotations may be troublesome because they are often taken out of
context and do not reflect official company positions. Regardless,
the Federal Circuit opinion highlights the fact that i4i's expert took
many precautions and factors into account to arrive at the used
royalty rate.18 9 For example, i4i's expert assumed that every
company that did not respond to his survey did not use the WORD
capabilities in an infringing manner, necessarily introducing a
serious "downward bias."' 9 °
An additional notable aspect of the appellate court's opinion is
that the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the decisions in Ricoh and
Lucent, and it again showed that when assessing infringement of
patented components in computer software, the focus will likely
remain on the use of the component itself and not the product as a
whole.'
However, it may be important to note that one aspect
common to all three cases is that each case dealt with infringing
components that were determined to be separable features from the
186. See i4iLtd P'ship, 589 F.3d at1269-71; i4iLtd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70104, at *55-57.
187. Alan Cox & Mario Lopez, 2 Economists' Take On i4i V. Microsoft,
LAw360 (Nov. 23, 2009) availableat http://www.nera.com/image/PUBLaw
360_Nov2009.pdf.
188. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1269.
189. Id. at 1270-71.
190. Id. at 1271.
191. Id. at 1264-65. In Ricoh, the Federal Circuit held that the question of
whether a noninfringingin use was "substantial" should focus on the individual
component and not the larger product. 550 F.3d at 1337. In Lucent, the
Federal Circuit held that a particular tool with in a larger software package may
be the relevant component in assessing infringement. 580 F.3d at 1320-21.
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larger product.192 As seen in this case, when the patented feature is
independent and separable from the overall program, then analysis
of whether any non-infringing use is substantial will necessarily
focus on the patented feature itself and not the overall software.'9 3
Furthermore, the fact that the component is used in a larger
product will not deter courts from granting injunctive relief.
Ultimately, nearly all of the jury findings and District Court
holdings were upheld on appeal. However, both the opinions
indicate that many of Microsoft's legal arguments were waived for
failure to make the necessary motions at the requisite times
throughout trial. 94 Further, both opinions seemed to indicate that
some of the waived motions would have been more likely to
succeed.'95 While the mere fact that many legal theories had been
forfeited does not guarantee that the decision would have turned
out differently, in harmonizing the district court and Federal
Circuit opinions with precedent, these waivers should be analyzed
prudently. In the end, and if nothing else, the i4i case teaches a
valuable lesson in properly timing motions to preserve arguments
for both at trial and on appeal.
NicholasA. Restauri

192. See Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1337; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1320; i4i Ltd. P'ship,
589 F.3d at 1264-65.
193. i4iLtd.P'ship, 589 F.3d at 1264-65.
194. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *12, *16, *26, *36,
*39.
195. See, e.g., id. at *37-39; i4i Ltd. P'ship,589 F.3d at 1261.
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